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Abstract 
The present study investigated how social-cognitive development relates to children’s 
lie-telling and the effectiveness of a novel honesty promoting technique (i.e., self-
awareness). Sixty-four children were asked not to peek at a toy in the experimenter’s 
absence and were later asked about whether they had peeked as a measure of their 
honesty. Half of the children were questioned in the self-awareness condition and half 
in the control condition. Additionally, children completed a battery of cognitive and 
social-cognitive tests to assess executive functioning and theory-of-mind 
understanding. While first-order theory-of-mind understanding, inhibitory control, 
and visuospatial working memory did not significantly relate to children’s lie-telling, 
measures of inhibitory control in conjunction with working memory and complex 
working memory were significantly related to children’s lie-telling. Finally, the novel 
honesty promoting technique was effective: children in the self-aware condition lied 
significantly less often than children in the control condition.  
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Introduction 
Everyone tells lies, even children (e.g., DePaulo, Kashy, Kirkendol, Wyer, & 
Epstein, 1996; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Lie-telling refers to an individual intentionally 
making a statement that they themselves (i.e., the lie-teller) believes to be untrue. 
Talwar and Lee (2008) proposed a developmental model of lie-telling in children. 
Very young children, 2- to 3-year-olds, are suggested to make primary lies. These lies 
are deliberately untrue statements that do not necessarily take the mental state of a 
listener into account (i.e., wishful thinking). Between the ages of 4- and 6-years, 
children progress and begin telling secondary lies, or lies that take into account the 
listener's mental state. That is, children now can understand that if the listener is 
unaware of the true state of affairs, they can instill a false belief in their mind. Beyond 
this stage, children enter the tertiary lie stage; here, they have the capability of 
concealing the fact that they have told a lie by maintaining consistency across their 
statements. The present study focuses on children between the ages of 3- to 6- years 
and the secondary lie stage, and is therefore examining children who can intentionally 
make statements they believe to untrue. Moreover, lies are often categorized as either 
antisocial or prosocial. Antisocial lies are told for self-serving purposes, such as to 
conceal a transgression or avoid punishment. Alternatively, prosocial lie-telling is told 
without the intent of harm, and is used to maintain amicable relationships. The present 
study will be focusing specifically on children's antisocial lie-telling. 
Although children can tell lies, lie-telling is a complicated social process that 
they need to navigate their way through. The complication arises because adults’ 
responses to children’s lies can be paradoxical.  On one hand, children are told that 
lying is morally wrong and can result in negative consequences, such as punishment. 
On the other hand, if children's lies go undetected, allowing them to successfully 
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conceal a transgression, lie-telling is implicitly encouraged. This inconsistent 
punishment and reward system makes it difficult for children to discover when they 
should or should not tell a lie. Not only is it difficult for children to understand when 
it is beneficial for them to lie, children also have to become cognitively mature 
enough for the act of lying (e.g., Evans & Lee, 2011; Evans & Lee, 2013; Talwar & 
Lee, 2008). For example, social-cognitive and cognitive skills relate to children's 
ability to tell and maintain lies. Though there has been evidence that certain skills 
such as inhibitory control, working memory, and theory of mind relate to lie-telling, 
the individual contribution of these skills to lie-telling is currently unclear.  
Despite the positive aspects to lie-telling (e.g., showing that children are 
developing cognitively), lie-telling is a behaviour that is viewed as being morally 
wrong (e.g., Bok, 1989) and thus honesty promotion is important. For example, lie-
telling can have a negative impact on social relationships by damaging trust and 
reducing the quality of relationships with others (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et 
al., 1996; Evans & Lee, 2014; Schweitzer, Hershey, & Bradlow, 2006). Furthermore, 
when it comes to children telling lies within the legal system they could potentially be 
put at risk. For example, if children lie about an abusive situation, such as denying 
that abuse has actually occurred, they could be kept in danger due to their deception. 
So, promoting honesty in childhood is not only necessary for social relationships, but 
it can also help protect individuals in the court system. 
My thesis will examine how social-cognitive and cognitive development 
relates to moral development by examining moral (lie-telling) as well as social-
cognitive and cognitive (theory of mind and executive functioning) development in 
action through children’s lie-telling behaviours. Specifically, this study will look at 
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children’s lie-telling, a novel method for promoting honesty, and how social-cognitive 
and cognitive development relates to both of these factors.  
Children’s Understanding of Truth and Lies  
 With age children become better at categorizing truths and lies, transitioning 
from a focus on the factuality of a statement to the actual intention of the speaker 
when determining whether a statement is a lie. Children begin categorizing truths and 
lies in their preschool years. Although their understanding of these categories starts 
early, it is quite rudimentary (Talwar & Crossman 2011). Young children view lies 
rather concretely defining them in a rule-based manner assuming anything said that is 
untrue, regardless of intention, is a lie (Peterson, Peterson & Seeto, 1983; Strichartz & 
Burton, 1990). This concrete view of lying is based on young children’s reliance on 
the factuality of a statement (i.e., whether the statement is correct or incorrect) in 
determining whether a statement is a lie. For example, children even categorize 
individuals giving incorrect directions by accident as lie-tellers, failing to take 
intention into consideration (Peterson et al., 1983). Their categorization does become 
more sophisticated with age, and by 11 years children begin to rely on the intention of 
the speaker to decide whether statements are lies (Strichartz & Burton, 1990). Taken 
together, we see that children’s understanding of categorizing lies moves from being 
concrete and inflexible to being more abstract and flexible with age. 
 Like their categorical understanding of truths and lies, children’s moral 
evaluations of truths and lies also develops with age, starting with an outcome focus 
(i.e., punishment) then transitioning to an intention focus (i.e., lies are morally bad, 
and truths are morally good). For example, though preschool-aged children judged 
lies more negatively than truths, they also judged lies that were punished as worse 
than lies that were not punished (Bussey, 1992). Thus, preschoolers not only ignore 
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the intention when categorizing a lie, they also ignore intention and solely focus on 
the outcome of a lie (i.e., consequence of punishment or not) when morally evaluating 
it. However, by age 7 children stopped using punishment as a basis for morally 
evaluating lies. Thus, they viewed lies that are punished and not punished similarly, as 
they have begun to take the intention of behaviour into consideration for their moral 
evaluations. These findings demonstrate that while preschool-aged children have an 
understanding that lies are worse than the truth, they do not develop a comprehensive 
understanding of lies regardless of punishment until middle childhood.  
 Although more rudimentary than older children, even young children 
understand what a lie is and that it is morally wrong to tell lies; despite this 
understanding children still lie. For example, Talwar, Lee, Bala and Lindsay (2002) 
examined children's conceptual knowledge about truth and lies and how it related to 
their actual behaviour. Conceptual knowledge was assessed with stories about a child 
who transgressed (e.g., a child ate a candy she was told to not eat) and denied that 
transgression. Children were asked whether what she said was the truth or a lie and 
whether it was good or bad.  In addition, they were asked whether they would confess 
to that transgression if it was them in that situation. Children also participated in a 
temptation resistance paradigm in which they were given an opportunity to transgress 
by cheating at a game (i.e., peeking at a toy they were asked to not peek at) in the 
absence of the experimenter. They were then were questioned about their behaviour 
(see Methods for details; Lewis, Stranger & Sullivan, 1989) to assess their actual lie-
telling behaviours. Although the majority of children correctly identified the 
untruthful statement as a lie and said that they would confess if they had been the one 
who transgressed, the majority of children also lied after peeking in the temptation 
resistance paradigm. That is, children's responses were not significantly related to 
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their actual truth- and lie-telling behaviours. Nonetheless, this type of reaction is not 
surprising: if children state that they would not transgress it makes them appear 
morally good. Similarly, lying about a transgression they themselves have committed 
(i.e., saying they did not transgress, even though they did) also makes them appear 
morally good, if the lie does not become discovered. Thus, children are giving 
socially appropriate responses in the given scenarios. This type of behaviour is not 
unique to children. In fact Jensen, Arnett, Feldman and Cauffman (2002) showed that 
approximately 60% of college students cheated using someone else's homework in the 
previous year, despite the moral wrongness and academic penalties set in place to deal 
with cheating in colleges. Though children understand lie-telling is bad, they still do 
it, even at a young age, because they want to appear morally good. In doing so, if 
children transgress they need to learn to lie to hide transgressions as to stay out of 
trouble.  
Developmental Foundation of Lie-Telling   
 Not only does children's understanding of lies develop with age, but their lie-
telling behaviours do as well: children begin lying with increased frequency over the 
preschool years, and after age 6 they become sophisticated in their ability to conceal 
their lies. There are two main components of lie-telling: initial lie-telling behaviours 
(the decision to lie) and semantic leakage control (concealment of lie). First, when 
asked a question, children need to decide whether or not to actually tell a lie: their 
initial lie-telling behaviour.  This decision to lie begins to emerge in children around 2 
years of age (Newton, Reddy, & Bull, 2000; Wilson, Smith & Ross, 2003). The 
frequency with which children will tell lies to conceal a transgression increases with 
age (Lee, 2013). For example, at the age of 2 few children tell lies to conceal their 
transgression (approximately 30%), whereas by 4 years of age the majority of 
6 
 
 
 
children lie (between 70-80%). After 4 years of age, lie-telling rates stay relatively 
stable into middle childhood. Children also become more sophisticated in their ability 
to successfully lie with age. In particular, young children will often leak information 
that gives away the fact that they have lied (Talwar & Lee, 2008). This is known as 
semantic leakage. By 6 to 8 years of age children begin to control this leakage, 
demonstrating semantic leakage control, the second component of lie-telling. That is, 
after children decide to lie they need to conceal the leakage of information that reveals 
their transgression and initial lie by maintaining consistency across statements. This 
makes their lie-telling harder to detect. A common method for examining children's 
lie-telling behaviours is the temptation resistance paradigm (see Methods for details; 
Lewis, et al., 1989) which allows for children to lie naturally and spontaneously. The 
current investigation specifically examined children between the ages of 3 and 6 
years; since children do not start demonstrating semantic leakage control abilities 
until after age 6, for purposes of this thesis I will only be focusing on the initial lie-
telling component.   
 Due to the steep increase in children's initial lie-telling behaviours from age 
two to four, a theory has been proposed to explain the developmental increase: the 
ToM1 Hypothesis (Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002). This theory posits that 
first-order false-belief understanding is required to tell a lie. First-order false-belief 
understanding refers to the ability to identify that you possess knowledge that can be 
different from another person's knowledge. According to the ToM1 Hypothesis you 
must understand that someone else can have different knowledge than you, so you 
have the ability to instill a false belief in their mind. Few studies have directly tested 
the ToM1 Hypothesis, and the results have been inconsistent (Evans et al., 2011; Polak 
& Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Specifically, Talwar and Lee (2008) had 
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children complete both the temptation resistance paradigm and a measure of first-
order false-belief understanding. In support of the ToM1 Hypothesis, these researchers 
found that children who had higher first-order false-belief scores were more likely to 
tell lies than children with lower first-order false-belief scores. Polak and Harris 
(1999) also found support for the ToM1 Hypothesis with children between the ages of 
3 and 5 in Experiment 2: children who had higher first-order false-belief scores were 
more likely to tell lies than those with lower scores. On the other hand, Polak and 
Harris (1999) did not find a significant relation between false-belief scores and 3- to 
5-year-olds' decisions to lie in Experiment 1. Additionally, Evans and colleagues 
(2011) did not find a significant relationship between 4-year-olds' false-belief 
understanding and their decision to lie. Consequently, what role theory-of-mind has 
on children's initial lie-telling behaviours is unclear. Given the inconsistencies, the 
present study aimed to not only address the ToM1 Hypothesis by examining how first-
order false-belief relates to the development of children's initial lie-telling behaviours, 
but it also aimed to examine the impact of theory-of-mind on a novel honesty 
promoting technique (see below).  
 Whereas the ToM1 Hypothesis focuses on a social-cognitive perspective to lie-
telling, another theory, the Activation-Decision-Construction Model (ADCM; 
Walczyk, Mahoney, Doverspike & Griffith-Ross, 2009) attempts to explain the 
increase in lie-telling across the preschool years in relation to cognitive  
development (i.e., executive functioning skills such as working memory and 
inhibitory control). The ToM1 Hypothesis and the ADCM are not mutually exclusive 
theories, as they are examining different aspects of development that are related (e.g., 
theory of mind and executive functioning). The ADCM has three components: 
activation, decision and construction (See Figure 1). According to this theory, when a 
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question is asked (e.g., Did you peek at the toy?) it automatically activates the truth in 
the long term memory store, priming semantic and episodic memories as the truth is 
transferred from the long term memory system to the working memory system (which 
refers to a temporary holding and processing system in the mind; Baddeley, 1986). 
This is the Activation component. Working memory must then hold the activated 
truth. Next, the Decision component comes into play as the decision to either tell the 
truth or a lie is made. If the decision is made to tell the truth, the truthful statement 
currently held in the working memory system is simply made. However, if the 
decision to tell a lie is made then the third component, Construction, is initiated. Here, 
the truth that is currently held in working memory is then processed and manipulated 
within the system to provide an alternative response—a lie. Thus, this requires 
processing above and beyond the working memory demands of simply stating the 
truth (i.e., merely temporarily holding the truth information). Additionally, when 
giving the dishonest statement, the truth also needs to be inhibited. Thus, in testing 
this model two hypotheses are proposed. First, it is proposed that working memory 
will relate to lie-telling because children would have to manipulate the truth that is 
currently held in working memory to construct a lie based on the truth (which should 
involve rehearsal as well as processing of information within working memory). It is 
also proposed that working memory and inhibitory control will collectively predict 
lie-telling: working memory to hold the activated truth memory as well as the lie, and 
inhibitory control for inhibiting the truth when stating the lie.  
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   Figure 1. A model of ADCM for children's lie-telling about a transgression (based on Walczyk, et al. 2009)  
Question 
asked:  
Did you 
peek at 
the toy?  
Child Transgresses 
(i.e., Peeks at Toy) 
 
1) Activation Component: 
Truth enters working 
memory. 
2) Decision 
Component 
If decision to tell the 
truth is made, child 
states: 
Yes I peeked 
 
Child states lie: 
No I did not peek 
If decision to lie is made 
3) Construction Component 
begins: Truth held in working 
memory is then manipulated. 
Truth inhibited & lie is 
formed 
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Although some studies have examined executive functioning skills and how they 
relate to the development of children’s lie-telling, how inhibitory control and working 
memory alone, or in conjunction, contribute to lie-telling is not clear. Currently literature 
that has examined working memory in terms of lie-telling suggests that working memory 
and lie-telling are not related. For example, Talwar and Lee (2008) examined working 
memory in relation to 3- to 8- year-old children's lie-telling using the Six Box Scramble 
task (Diamond, Prevor, Callender, & Druin, 1997; see Methods for details). Children's 
performance on this working memory task was not significantly related to their lie-telling 
behaviours in the temptation resistance paradigm and these researchers concluded that 
working memory does not relate to children's decision to lie. Additionally, Evans and Lee 
(2011) examined the relation between 8- to 16-year-old children's lie-telling and working 
memory using the Backward Digit Span. Similar to Talwar and Lee (2008) they did not 
find that working memory was significantly related to older children's decision to lie.  
 Although no significant relationship between working memory and lie-telling was 
found in either study, there could be methodological explanations for this. To start, little 
is known about how different components of working memory relate to lie-telling. 
Talwar and Lee (2008) might have used a working memory measure that assesses an 
aspect of working memory that may not relate to lie-telling. For example, the working 
memory system can be broken down into four subsystems: the phonological loop, the 
visuospatial sketchpad, the central executive, and the episodic buffer (Baddeley, 1986). 
The phonological loop refers to the phonological short term storage system which is also 
responsible for subvocal rehearsal. The visuospatial sketchpad stores visual and spatial 
information. The central executive is responsible for processing information as well as 
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regulating attention, action, and problem solving in both the phonological and visual 
systems. Finally, the episodic buffer is responsible for transferring information from the 
working memory store into the long-term memory store. Talwar and Lee's (2008) 
working memory task, the Six Box Scramble, relies on visuospatial processing; children 
need to remember which of the six coloured boxes they've already opened to find each 
sticker inside the boxes which were scrambled after each trial. Young children often have 
difficulty with transferring visuospatial details to the phonological loop via rehearsal 
(e.g., Hitch & Halliday, 1983; Hitch, Halliday, Schaafstal, & Schraagen, 1988). Thus, 
when completing the Six Box Scramble task, young children rely solely on their 
visuospatial working memory system. The fact that no relationship was found between 
this visuospatial task and lie-telling is not surprising given that telling a lie in the 
temptation resistance paradigm is verbal behaviour which should not rely on visuospatial 
processing of information.  
 Alternatively, Evans and Lee (2011) used a different measure, the Backward Digit 
Span, which is suggested to involve both the central executive (to process information) 
and the phonological loop (to rehearse information processed by the central executive; 
Baddeley & Logie,1999). It has been suggested that complex working memory measures 
are those that tap into the central executive and phonological loop exclusively. According 
to the ADCM (Walczyk et al., 2009), complex working memory should relate to lie-
telling because to tell a lie you need to hold the truth in the working memory store, which 
should involve rehearsal (i.e., phonological loop) while constructing a lie, which should 
involve processing the truth to make up a lie (i.e., central executive). Evans and Lee 
(2011) did not find complex working memory (as measured by the Backward Digit Span) 
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to be significantly related to the decision to lie in older children. However, by the age of 
8 children have met the minimum requirement of executive functioning skills necessary 
for the decision to lie, so all children are capable of doing it (e.g., Evans & Lee, 2011; 
Talwar & Lee, 2008). Nonetheless, they do not necessarily have the executive 
functioning requirements to complete the second part of lie-telling, semantic leakage 
control, successfully. In fact, Evans and Lee (2011) found that semantic leakage control 
was significantly related to complex working memory. Thus, because young children 
have not yet met the minimum working memory requirements for the initial decision to 
lie, complex working memory should be related to younger children's decision to lie. 
Taken together, the present study aims to examine both visuospatial working memory 
and complex working memory in relation to the decision to lie to assess whether specific 
types of working memory are related to children’s decision to lie.  
 Another executive functioning skill whose contribution to lie-telling is currently 
unclear is inhibitory control. Inhibitory control refers to the ability to control your 
behaviours and thoughts by suppressing a prepotent response and instead providing a 
more appropriate or alternative response (Diamond, 2013). Some researchers have 
suggested that inhibitory control tasks have varying reliance on working memory, with 
some tasks requiring more working memory than others (Carlson & Moses, 2001). For 
example, some tasks involve simply inhibiting a response (e.g., Simon Says like tasks), 
which has low dependence on working memory, whereas other tasks involve action of a 
conflicting or alternative response (e.g., Stroop), which places higher demands on 
working memory. According to the ADCM (Walczyk et al., 2009), inhibitory control 
tasks that rely more heavily on working memory should be related to lie-telling as 
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working memory is needed to hold the activated truth memory, as well as the lie, at the 
same time that inhibitory control is suppressing stating the truth.  
  It has been suggested that inhibitory control Stroop-like tasks are working 
memory dependent as they require children to remember and inhibit their dominant 
response while producing a conflicting response (Evans & Lee, 2011; Evans & Lee, 
2013; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Consistent with the ADCM, studies have shown that Stroop-
task scores relate to children's decision to lie about a transgression, at least in younger 
children. Evans and Lee (2013) used the Shape Stroop task, a non-verbal Stroop task, 
with 2- to 3-year-olds. Children were shown pictures of two large fruit with small fruit 
embedded in the centre of them. Children were told that they should always point to the 
small fruit. For example, in a "banana trial" there would be a large banana with a small 
apple inside of it beside a large orange with a small banana inside it. To be correct, 
children would need to inhibit their prepotent response of pointing to the bigger banana, 
and instead point to the small banana. Children were found to be significantly more likely 
to lie with increased performance on the Shape Stroop task. Similarly, Talwar and Lee 
(2008) used the Day/Night Stroop task, a verbal Stroop task (see Methods for details) 
with children aged 3 to 8 years and found that children who had lied about peeking at the 
toy during a temptation resistance paradigm had higher Day/Night Stroop scores than 
children who had confessed to the transgression. Evans and Lee (2011) examined 8- to 
16-year-olds' Word/Colour Stroop task scores in relation to lie-telling behaviours. The 
Word/Colour Stroop task involves children being shown colour words (e.g., Blue, Red, 
and Green) printed in an opposing ink colour and asking them to say the colour of the ink 
out loud. Thus, children needed to inhibit the automatic response of reading the word and 
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suppress it while simultaneously stating the ink colour. Additionally, an age-modified 
temptation resistance paradigm was used to assess their lie-telling behaviour. Results 
revealed that the Stroop-task was not significantly related to children’s decision to lie; 
however, it was related to their semantic leakage control abilities. Again, it seems then 
that younger children have not yet met the minimum requirements for inhibitory control 
and working memory skills needed for the decision to lie, so the decision to lie is a 
difficult feat. Alternatively, older children have better inhibitory control and working 
memory skills, and have met the minimum requirements necessary for the decision to lie 
by 8 years of age (see Evans & Lee, 2011; Talwar, Gordon, & Lee, 2007; Talwar & Lee, 
2008). Nonetheless, not all older children have the skills necessary to demonstrate 
semantic leakage control. Thus, inhibitory control and working memory collectively 
might be related to children under the age of 8 years' decision to lie.  
 Although Stroop tasks are purported to tap into both inhibitory control and 
working memory skills, it is unclear whether one or both of these skills are driving the 
relation between the Stroop task and lie-telling. This is because no study has used a 
Stroop task alongside tasks that solely measure working memory and solely measure 
inhibitory control to assess their individual or combined contributions. Although it is 
difficult to find a measure of inhibitory control that does not require the use of working 
memory, there are measures that are proposed to require less working memory (e.g., 
Diamond, 2013).  
 Lie-telling is proposed to require both inhibitory control and working memory 
(e.g., ADCM; Walczyk et al., 2009) because children need to hold the truth in working 
memory, provide an alternative statement (i.e., a lie), while simultaneously inhibiting the 
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truth. Given this, it is hypothesized that tasks solely measuring inhibitory control (i.e., 
merely suppressing a response) should not relate to lie-telling: children should need to 
not only suppress a response (i.e., the truth) but also provide a conflicting response (i.e., 
the lie). Thus, it is expected that inhibitory control will not relate to children’s lie-telling 
unless in combination with working memory. Furthermore, it is expected that complex 
working memory, composed of the central executive and phonological loop, will be 
related to the decision to lie. However, because working memory on its own is expected 
to be related to lie-telling, working memory could end up driving the relationship 
between the combination of inhibitory control and working memory with lie-telling.    
Honesty Promotion Research with Children  
 Lie-telling is a natural and normative behaviour that we all do (e.g., DePaulo, et 
al., 1996; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Given that it is normal, there is a positive side to lie-
telling, as it shows that children are advancing in their social-cognitive and cognitive 
development (Evans & Lee, 2011; Evans & Lee, 2013; Talwar & Lee, 2008). 
Nonetheless, lie-telling can have negative social implications. For example, in social 
relationships lying damages trust (DePaulo & Kashy, 1998; DePaulo et al., 1996; Evans 
& Lee, 2014; Schweitzer, et al., 2006). Thus, promoting honesty is a necessity in building 
healthy social relationships. Additionally, promoting honesty has practical implications 
ranging from morality education programs for parents and teachers to applications within 
the legal system. For example, parents and teachers can be aided in their ability to 
provide morality education if they are aware of techniques and methods that promote 
honesty. Furthermore, when it comes to the legal system, there are large numbers of 
children testifying in court each year (e.g., 100,000 as estimated by Bruck, Ceci, & 
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Hembroooke, 1998) including children as young as 3 years of age (Bala, Lee, Lindsay, & 
Talwar, 2000). In addition, children are often the only witnesses to certain types of abuse 
cases, such as child sexual abuse; thus, accuracy of reporting is vitally important for both 
the safety and protection of the child as well as the accused. Despite its social and 
practical importance, only a limited number of studies have experimentally examined 
methods in promoting honesty in children (Lyon & Dorado, 2008; Lyon et al., 2014; 
Talwar, et al., 2002).  
 Successful techniques. There are only three types of successful honesty 
promoting techniques that have been experimentally examined to date: promising to tell 
the truth, reassurance, and putative confession (e.g., Lyon & Dorado, 2008; Lyon et al., 
2014; Talwar, et al., 2002). One way to increase children's honesty is having children 
promise to tell the truth (Lyon & Dorado, 2008; Talwar, et al., 2002). Whether children 
completed a transgression alone (e.g., Talwar, et al., 2002) or with a confederate (Lyon & 
Dorado, 2008), simply asking children ranging in ages from 3- to 7-years to promise to 
tell the truth significantly reduced their likelihood of telling a lie compared to children 
who did not promise to tell the truth. Reassuring children that they will not get into 
trouble for telling the truth after they completed a transgression with a confederate also 
significantly reduced lie-telling rates (Lyon & Dorado, 2008). The reassurance and 
promising to tell the truth methods were not significantly different in their effectiveness. 
Finally, for the putative confession, an interviewer tells children that the confederate told 
them everything that had happened when they played with her, and the confederate 
wanted the child to tell the truth. Children who received the putative confession after 
completing a transgression with a confederate had reduced lie-telling rates. Although all 
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three methods were found to be effective, lie-telling rates are still fairly high (around 
50%); thus, other techniques need to be explored. 
 Self-awareness. A novel method being proposed in the present investigation that 
may increase honesty is inducing self-awareness. Self-awareness refers to being 
internally focused; that is, aware of ourselves and how others perceive us (Duval & 
Wickland, 1972). Duval and Wickland (1972) proposed a theory of objective self-
awareness that suggests by bringing ourselves to our own attention as an object, for 
example through the use of a mirror we can increase our self-awareness and self-
evaluation.  
 Self-awareness could reduce lie-telling behaviours because it increases adherence 
to social norms in both children and adults (Beaman Klentz, Diener, & Svanum, 1979; 
Diener & Wallbom, 1976; Gino & Mogilner, 2014). For example, Beaman et al. (1979) 
conducted field studies to examine how self-awareness through use of a mirror affects 
transgressing in children and found that children who were self-aware and individuated 
(i.e., asked personal questions about themselves, such as their name, age and address) 
transgressed less often than children who were not self-aware. This finding has also been 
found in adults (Gino & Mogilner, 2014). When primed to think about money, and given 
an opportunity to cheat at a game, adults were more likely to cheat when they did not 
have a mirror in front of them vs. when they did have a mirror in front of them. These 
findings suggest that inducing self-awareness reduces transgression rates; however, it is 
currently unknown whether it is related to other moral behaviours and social norms, such 
as telling the truth.  
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 Not only does self-awareness affect a moral behaviour (e.g., transgressing), it also 
leads to adherence to social norms for non-morally relevant behaviours. The majority of 
children become self-aware by the age of 20 months (Amsterdam, 1972; Rochat, 
Broesch, & Jayne, 2012). Additionally, once children become self-aware, they begin to 
reference themselves in terms of how others would perceive and evaluate them. For 
example, Rochat et al. (2012) had children play a game in which an experimenter tapped 
their stomach, shoulders, and foreheads. Unbeknownst to the children, when their 
foreheads were tapped a yellow post-it note was placed on them. Children were randomly 
assigned to two conditions: Classic and Norm. In the classic condition, children had the 
post-it note placed on their foreheads by the experimenter. In the Norm condition parents 
sitting in the room with the children and the experimenter put post-it notes onto their 
foreheads as well, making wearing a post-it note the norm of the room. Of the children 
who became self-aware through use of the mirror, almost all children in the Classic 
condition removed the post-it note when they noticed it on their forehead in the mirror. 
Alternatively, the majority of children in the in the Norm condition hesitated in removing 
the post-it note from their forehead. That is, children who became self-aware then also 
adhered to social norms: children who were made to feel like wearing a post-it note was 
the norm (Norm condition) adhered to the norm by hesitating in removing the post-it 
note. In contrast, children who were made to feel like it was an oddity to be wearing a 
post-it note on their forehead (Classic condition) had no hesitation in removing it. This 
suggests that through the use of a mirror children not only became self-aware, but also 
became aware of how others perceive and evaluate them and consequently acted in 
accordance with social norms. Taken together, studies suggest that children's moral 
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behaviours (e.g., transgressing by stealing candy; Beaman et al., 1979) are affected by 
becoming self-aware and that being self-aware is also related to adherence to social 
norms (Rochat et al., 2012). Thus, when self-awareness is induced, children should 
adhere to the social and moral norm of honesty and be less likely to lie than children who 
are not self-aware. 
Present Study 
 Cognitive factors. The present study investigated the development of lie-telling 
behaviours in children between 3 and 6 years of age. This age range was selected because 
up until the age of 6 the decision to lie is cognitively challenging for children, whereas 
older children seem to have the executive functioning skill requirements necessary for the 
decision to lie. Instead, semantic leakage control is difficult for older children as it is 
cognitively challenging for them. Thus, children over the age of 6 were not of interest for 
the present study. The current investigation predicted that, consistent with previous 
research, older children will be more likely to lie than younger children (Lee, 2013), as 
children develop better social-cognitive and cognitive skills (such as theory of mind and 
executive functioning) with age. Next, the current investigation examined the validity of 
two theoretical models: The ToM1 Hypothesis and the ADCM by observing how social-
cognitive and cognitive factors (i.e., theory of mind and executive functioning) relate to 
the development of children’s decision to lie. Given that there are inconsistent findings in 
regards to the ToM1 Hypothesis (Talwar & Lee, 2008; Polak & Harris, 1999), the present 
study aimed to explore this hypothesis further. In addition to examining whether first-
order false-belief is related to lie-telling I assessed the interaction between theory of mind 
and self-awareness as an honesty promoting technique (see below).  
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 In addition, while recent studies have begun to define the relationships between 
executive function skills and lie-telling (Evans & Lee, 2011; Evans & Lee, 2013; Talwar 
& Lee, 2008), it remains unclear whether it is executive functioning as a whole that is 
related to lie-telling, or whether individual factors are particularly important. The present 
study will address this through testing the ADCM with the use of five executive 
functioning tasks: three inhibitory control and two working memory. The inhibitory 
control tasks are thought to vary in their dependence on working memory. Alternatively, 
the working memory tasks have little reliance on inhibitory control, but examine different 
aspects of working memory: visuospatial vs. complex working memory (which requires 
both phonological loop and the central executive). In terms of working memory, it is 
expected that complex working memory rather than visuospatial working memory will 
relate to lie-telling. Talwar and Lee (2008) did not find a relationship between children's 
lie-telling and visuospatial working memory, which makes sense as processing or storing 
of visuospatial information should not be necessary for this form of lie-telling. 
Alternatively, complex working memory should relate to lie-telling as the ADCM 
suggests that to tell a lie you need to hold the truth in the working memory store, which 
involves rehearsal (phonological loop), while at the same time a lie has to be constructed 
by processing the truth to make up the lie (central executive). Furthermore inhibitory 
control alone should not relate to lie-telling, but it is predicted that children with better 
scores on inhibitory control tasks that are working memory dependent should be more 
likely to lie; this is consistent with the ADCM as well (Walczyk et al., 2009), as children 
would need to hold the contents of the truth and lie in their working memory while 
inhibiting the truth to produce the lie. Nonetheless, since it is also predicted that complex 
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working memory will relate to lie-telling, it is unclear whether working memory in 
general will be driving this relationship between lie-telling and the combination of 
working memory and inhibitory control.  
 Self-awareness. The present study examines moral development specifically by 
aiming to increase adherence to social norms of a moral behaviour (i.e., honesty) through 
inducing self-awareness. It is predicted that children in the self-awareness condition will 
tell lies less often than children in the control condition. Given that truth telling is an 
important social norm, and increased self-awareness appears to increase adherence to 
socially-valued norms (Beaman et al., 1979; Rochat et al., 2012), when made self-aware 
and asked about their transgression by an adult children should feel more obligated to tell 
the truth.   
 A further aim is to examine how theory-of-mind development relates to the 
adherence to social norms, as measured by honesty, when children are either self-aware 
or not. It is predicted that there will be a theory of mind by condition interaction, with 
theory of mind's relation to lie-telling being affected in opposite directions for each 
condition. Children in the control condition with higher first-order false-belief scores 
should be more likely to tell a lie, which is consistent with the ToM1 Hypothesis (Polak & 
Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002). Alternatively, children in the self-awareness 
condition should have increased social awareness and this self-awareness should increase 
their adherence to social norms (e.g., Rochat et al., 2012), such as honesty. Additionally, 
children with higher first-order false-belief scores specifically should have a better social 
understanding and be able to think about how their behaviour impacts others. Thus, once 
self-awareness is induced, children with higher first-order false-belief understanding 
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should be the most likely to act in accordance with the social norm of honesty and be less 
likely to tell a lie.  
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Method 
Participants 
 Sixty-four children aged 3:0 to 6:10 years recruited via community 
advertisements in St. Catharines, Ontario, participated in this study. Four children were 
excluded (Mage in months = 43.00, SD = 2.94) due to fussiness and equipment failure. The 
final sample consisted of 64 children: Mage in months = 56.51, SD =14.08, males = 26. There 
were 23 three-year-olds, 16 four-year-olds, 10 five-year-olds, and 15 six-year olds who 
participated. Informed consent was gathered from all parents and oral assent was 
gathered from all children prior to testing. 
Materials and Procedure 
Lie-telling behaviour. Children were tested individually in a small private room. 
Children began the session by completing a modified temptation resistance paradigm to 
assess their lie-telling behaviours (e.g., Lewis et al., 1989; Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar 
& Lee, 2002). Children were invited to play a guessing game in which they were turned 
around on their chair so that their back faced the experimenter. They were asked to 
identify a toy that was placed behind them based on the noise it made (e.g., A toy cow 
“moos”). Two practice trials were conducted that were meant to be easy enough so that 
children could successfully guess the toys’ identities. Then, the experimenter told 
children that she needed to leave the room for a minute to grab something for their next 
game that she had forgotten in her car. She asked them to not turn around and peek at the 
toy while she was gone and then placed the target toy, an elephant, on the table and left 
the room. The elephant played an ABC jingle sound that was unrelated to its identity 
which made accurately identifying the elephant based on its noise impossible without
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seeking. Hidden cameras were set up in the room to determine whether children peeked 
at the toy in the experimenter’s absence. Children who peeked at the toy were classified 
as peekers, and those who did not peek were classified as non-peekers. After a 1-minute 
delay, the experimenter returned to the room to question children about whether they 
peeked at the toy while she was away. The experimenter was blind to children’s peeking 
behaviour.  Children were randomly assigned to either a heightened self-awareness 
condition (N = 31, Mage in months =57.35, SD =14.19) or control condition (N = 33, Mage in 
months = 55.73, SD = 14.16). In the self-awareness condition a mirror was placed at eye 
level between children and the experimenter so children could see themselves during 
questioning about the transgression. According to Rochat and colleagues (2012) children 
in the present study should all be capable of becoming self-aware. Those in the self-
awareness condition were asked to point to parts of their face in the mirror (e.g., “Point to 
your nose in the mirror”, “Point to your ears in the mirror”). They were also asked what 
their name was and what grade they were in. The experimenter then repeated their 
response back to them. The purpose was to focus the children's attention internally. 
Lastly, the experimenter asked children, “Can you see yourself in the mirror?” to ensure 
they were still looking in the mirror. By having children look at themselves in the mirror 
and turning their focus internally (i.e., asking who they are and what grade they are in) 
during questioning, children’s self-awareness should be increased (Duval & Wickland, 
1972).  
In contrast, in the control condition the non-reflective side of the mirror faced 
children so they could not see their reflection during questioning. This group was asked 
to point to objects in the room (e.g., “Point to your chair”, “Point to the books”) so their 
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attention was not directed inwards; rather it was directed externally to objects in the 
room. This ensured children’s self-awareness was not heightened in the control condition. 
Next, all children were asked the target question: “Did you turn around and peek 
at the toy when I was gone?” Peekers who responded with a “yes” were categorized as 
truth-tellers and Peekers who respond “no” were categorized as lie-tellers. Non-peekers 
who respond “no” were categorized as truth-tellers. Based on previous studies (Polak & 
Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002) we did not expect to have non-peekers respond “yes” 
to the target question, thereby falsely confessing to peeking at the toy. Children were also 
asked two semantic leakage control follow-up questions. The first was “What do you 
think the toy is?” If children answered this semantic leakage control question correctly 
(i.e., saying the toy was an elephant) they demonstrated poor semantic leakage control 
because they leaked information that gave away the fact that they had lied. Alternatively, 
if children feigned ignorance by giving an answer of “I don’t know” or gave an incorrect 
answer (i.e., something other than an elephant) they demonstrated good semantic leakage 
control. The second follow-up question that was asked was “Why do you think it is X?”. 
This question gave children the opportunity to come up with a plausible explanation for 
their answer to the first question, specifically if they answered the first question correctly 
by saying "elephant". For example, if children explained their correct answer to the first 
follow-up (e.g., by saying “I have a toy elephant that plays that song”), they demonstrated 
good semantic leakage control–even though they did not demonstrate it initially. 
However, for purposes of this thesis the follow-up questions were not analyzed because 
children do not begin demonstrating semantic leakage control abilities until after the age 
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of 6 (e.g., Talwar & Lee, 2008). All tasks after the temptation resistance paradigm were 
completed in a between-subjects randomized order.  
Theory-of-mind tasks. Two first-order false-belief stories were displayed on a 
computer in PowerPoint as the experimenter read through them with children. The first 
story was a modified version of the Smarties task (Gopnik & Astington, 1988). A 
Smarties box appeared on the screen and children were asked Question 1: “What do you 
think is inside the box?” which was a control question to ensure children were paying 
attention to the story. If children did not pass this control question, they received a score 
of 0 on the story's first-order false-belief target questions. Children were then shown that 
there were crayons inside of the box and asked Question 2: “Before you looked inside, 
what did you think was inside of the box?” This was a target first-order false-belief 
question. If children's answer was Smarties, they received one point. If they indicated that 
something other than Smarties was in the box (i.e., crayons or something else) they did 
not receive a point. Children were then shown a picture of a cartoon child Max. They 
were told Max has never seen inside of the box before and asked Question 3: “What does 
Max think is inside the box?” This was the second target first-order false-belief question. 
It assessed whether children could correctly identify that Max has a belief that is 
mistaken. If children indicated Max would think Smarties were inside of the box they 
received one point. If they indicated something other than Smarties (i.e., crayons or 
something else) they did not receive a point. This task score ranged from 0-2 with a 
higher score indicating better first-order false-belief skills.  
The next story participants saw was a modified Sally-Anne task (Wimmer & 
Perner, 1983). For this story, children saw Sally put a ball into a basket and then leave the 
27 
 
 
 
room. While she was out of the room another girl, Anne, moved the ball from the basket 
into a box. Children were then asked Question 1: “When Sally returns to get her ball, 
where will she look first?” This was a target first-order false-belief question examining if 
children were able to understand someone else can have beliefs different from their own. 
If they indicated she would look in the basket they received a point. If they indicated 
elsewhere (i.e., the box or somewhere else) they received no point. Next, they were asked 
Question 2: “Where does Sally think the ball is?” This was the second target first-order 
false-belief question looking at whether children were able to understand that someone 
can have a mistaken belief. If children indicated Sally thought the ball was in the basket 
they received one point. If they indicated elsewhere (i.e., the box or somewhere else) they 
received no point. The last two questions: “Where is the ball now?” and “Where did Sally 
put the ball in the beginning?” served as control questions to ensure children were paying 
attention to the story. If children did not pass these control questions, they received a 
score of 0 on the story's first-order false-belief target questions. For the Sally-Anne task, 
children received a score that ranged from 0-2. Higher scores indicated better first-order 
false-belief skills. Finally, a total first-order false-belief score was created with children's 
scores from the two tasks added together.   
Executive functioning tasks. Children also completed a battery of executive 
functioning tasks.  
 Inhibitory control tasks. Inhibitory control was measured with three tasks, 
thought to vary in reliance on working memory.  
The Day/Night Stroop task (Gerstadt, Hong & Diamond, 1994). For this task 
children saw a series of pictures of either a sun or a moon; they were told to say “night” 
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when they saw a picture of a sun, and to say “day” when they saw a picture of the moon. 
This task is suggested to require both inhibitory control and working memory because 
children have to remember to inhibit their dominant response while producing a 
conflicting response. For example, children had to inhibit their natural response to the 
card (i.e., Saying “day” for the sun picture or saying “night” for the moon picture) while 
stating the opposite response. Children were given practice trials until they understood 
the rules and then they completed 16 test trials. Scores ranged from 0-16 and higher 
scores indicated better inhibitory control and working memory skills.  
Bear/Dragon task (Reed, Pien & Rothbart, 1984). For this task, children were 
shown two puppets: a Bear and a Dragon. One character was claimed to be friendly, and 
one was claimed to be naughty. The role of the Bear and Dragon as being friendly and 
naughty was counterbalanced between participants. Children were told to do what the 
Friendly puppet said to do, but not what the Naughty puppet said to do. After a few 
practice trials that ensured children understood the task, ten requests in total were given: 
five from the Friendly puppet and five from the Naughty puppet (e.g., “Stick out your 
tongue”, “Clap your hands”). This task has been suggested to be an inhibitory control 
task that requires working memory as children need to remember and inhibit their 
dominant response (reacting to the puppet) while producing a conflicting response (not 
reacting to the puppet). Thus, children had to inhibit responding to the requests from the 
Naughty puppet and only respond to the Friendly puppet to be successful. Each time 
children responded correctly to the inhibition (Naughty) request they received one point. 
This task was scored out of 5 and higher scores indicated better inhibitory control and 
working memory skills.  
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Delay of gratification task (Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zess, 1972). For this task, 
children were presented with three different kinds of snack treats (e.g., marshmallows, 
chocolate chips, or cereal treats) and were asked to choose their favourite treat. Next, two 
of their favourite treats were put on one plate and ten of the same treats were put on a 
second plate, both of which were placed in front of children. The experimenter told 
children that she had to step out of the room again and that if they waited to eat the treats 
until she returned they would get the plate with ten treats. Children were asked to ring a 
bell that was placed in front of them if they could not wait for her to return; by doing so 
she would return early and they would only get the plate with two treats. Children were 
given practice ringing the bell to ensure they knew how to ring it properly if they wanted 
to do so. Children were then asked “What happens if you wait the whole time?”, “What 
happens if you cannot wait?”, and “What happens if you ring the bell?” to ensure they 
understood the instructions before she left the room. If children did not understand the 
rules, the experimenter repeated them until they did. The experimenter then stepped out 
of the room for 5 minutes (300 seconds), until children rang the bell, or until they began 
to eat the treats. This task measured how well children could self-regulate and perform 
inhibitory control. This task measured length of time children waited from 0-300 seconds. 
The longer children waited the better inhibitory control skills they had.  
Working memory tasks. Working memory was assessed with two tasks. 
Six box scramble (Diamond et al., 1997). This task was a visuospatial working 
memory task. Six different coloured boxes were presented in a line in front of children. 
They were told there was a sticker hidden in each of the boxes and it was their job to find 
all the stickers by opening one box at a time. In between each trial the boxes were 
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scrambled. Therefore, to find all the stickers children had to remember which of the 
coloured boxes they had already opened. Children were given up to 15 attempts to find 
all six stickers. Final scores were calculated by taking the total number of attempts 
required to successfully retrieve all six stickers and subtracting it from 15, which was the 
maximum number of moves possible. Children’s scores ranged from 0-9, and higher 
scores indicated better visuospatial working memory skills.  
Backwards digit span task (Wechsler, 2003). This task tested children's complex 
working memory skills (i.e., central executive and phonological loop, see Baddeley & 
Logie, 1999). The experimenter stated numbers in sequence to the children; the 
sequences ranged from 2 to 8 digits in length. Children were asked to repeat the 
sequences in backward order. For example, the experimenter said 6-2 and children had to 
repeat the numbers 2-6 back to her. After two correct trials another digit was added to the 
sequence length making the task more and more difficult. Specifically, this task required 
children to use their central executive to process and manipulate the numbers said to them 
as well as required them to rehearse the numbers in their phonological loop to repeat 
them back to the experimenter. Once children were unable to successfully repeat two 
sequence s that were the same digit length in a row the task was terminated.  Each correct 
sequence was given a point of 1 and scores for this task ranged from 0-16. Higher scores 
indicated better complex working memory skills.   
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Results 
I will begin by describing children's peeking and lie-telling behaviour. Then I will 
examine differences in lie-telling rates by condition: self-awareness vs. control. I will 
also examine differences in lie-telling by each social-cognitive and cognitive factor (i.e., 
theory of mind, inhibitory control, and working memory). Preliminary results showed 
that there were no significant sex differences, so further analyses were collapsed across 
sex. 
Peeking Behaviour 
Overall, 78% (N = 50) of children peeked at the toy (see Table 1). Since the 
experimental condition (i.e., placing mirror in front of children) did not occur until after 
children peeked at the toy, no condition differences were expected in terms of peeking 
behaviours. To examine this, a chi-square test was conducted on the number of children 
who peeked by condition. There was no significant difference indicating that children in 
the self-awareness condition (77%) peeked just as often as children in the control 
condition (79%), χ2 (1, N = 64) = 0.02, p = .90. To examine whether there was a 
difference in the number of children who peeked based on their age, a chi-square test was 
conducted on the number of children who peeked by age in years, χ2 (3, N = 64) = 5.75, p 
= .12, which revealed children’s peeking behaviour did not significantly vary with age. 
Given that I am particularly interested in children's lie-telling behaviour, only children 
who peeked at the toy were examined further.
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Table 1          
Percentage of Children who Peeked and Percentage of Peekers who Lied by Age    
 3 Years ( n = 23) 4 Years (n = 16) 5 Years (n = 10) 6 Years (n = 16) Total  (N = 64)  
Peekers  83 88 50 80 78 
Lie-Tellers  47 64 60 92 65 
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Initial Lie-Telling Behaviour 
 Overall, 65% (N = 32) of the children who peeked at the toy lied about it (see 
Table 1). To examine the effects of age (whether children will be more likely to lie with 
age) a hierarchical logistic regression was conducted with peekers’ answers to the target 
question “Did you peek?” (0 = Truth, 1 = Lie) as the dependent variable. Children’s age 
in years was entered on the first step. Step 1 of the model was significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 
6.18, p =.013. As age increased, children were significantly more likely to lie about their 
transgression, ß = 0.69, Wald = 5.14, p = .023 (see Table 1). The odds ratio indicated that 
with each year increase in age, children were 1.99 times more likely to lie about their 
transgression. 
Social-cognitive and Cognitive Factors  
 First, I examined the relationship between children's lie-telling behaviours and 
social-cognitive and cognitive skills (theory of mind and executive functioning). I began 
by examining descriptives (see Table 2) and correlations (see Table 3) for each social-
cognitive and cognitive factor. I also performed t-tests to examine whether truth- and lie-
tellers differed in their executive functioning and theory of mind scores (see Table 4). 
Given that the sample size was relatively small, individual analyses were performed for 
each of the social-cognitive and cognitive skills. 
 Regarding the development of children's social-cognitive and cognitive skills and 
age, as expected, children’s scores on some inhibitory control tasks (Bear/Dragon and 
Delay of Gratification), a working memory task (Backward Digit Span), and the Theory-
of-Mind tasks were significantly positively related to age (see Table 3). In contrast, one 
inhibitory control task (Day/Night Stroop) and one working memory task (Six Box 
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Scramble) were not significantly related to age. Thus, age was controlled for in 
regression analyses for social-cognitive and cognitive tasks significantly related to age.  
Theory of mind. An independent samples t-test was conducted to assess whether 
First-Order False Belief (IV) related to children’s lie-telling behaviours (DV), which 
revealed truth (M = 1.24, SD = 1.30) and lie-tellers (M = 2.25, SD = 1.32) were 
significantly different on First-Order False Belief scores: t(47) = -2.57, p = .013 (see 
Table 4). Thus, children who lied had higher first-order false-belief scores than truth-
tellers.  
Given that First-Order False-Belief scores correlated with age (see Table 3), a 
hierarchical logistic regression was conducted to control for age. Peekers’ answers to the 
target question “Did you peek?” (0 = Truth, 1 = Lie) was used as the dependent variable. 
Children’s age in years was entered on the first step, followed by First-Order False-Belief 
scores on the second step. Step 1 of the model was significant, χ2 (1, N = 49) = 6.15, p 
=.013, indicating that as age increased, children were significantly more likely to lie 
about their transgression, ß = 0.70, Wald = 5.06, p = .024. Step 2 of the model was not 
significant, χ2 (1, N = 49) = 1.70, p =.192. Thus, children’s performance on the First-
Order False-Belief task did not significantly relate to their lie-telling behaviours above 
and beyond the contribution of age. 
Working memory tasks. 
Six box scramble. An independent samples t-test was conducted to assess whether 
children’s Six Box Scramble Scores (IV) related to their lie-telling behaviours (DV). 
Results show that truth (M = 6.88, SD = 1.99) and lie-tellers (M = 7.58, SD = 2.49) did 
not significantly differ on Six Box Scramble Scores: t(47) = -1.00, p = .32 (see Table 4). 
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Thus, scores on the Six Box Scramble task, which measures visuospatial working 
memory, did not significantly relate to children’s decision to lie.  
Backward digit span. An independent samples t-test was conducted to assess 
whether children’s Backward Digit Span Scores (IV) related to their lie-telling 
behaviours (DV), which revealed truth tellers (M = 1.31, SD = 2.06) had significantly 
lower scores than lie-tellers (M = 3.28, SD = 2.40): t(40) = -2.56, p =.014, d = -0.88 (see 
Table 4). Thus, children who lied had higher complex working memory scores, as 
measured by Backward Digit Span.  
Given that Backward Digit Span scores correlated with age (see Table 3), a 
hierarchical logistic regression was conducted to control for age. Peekers’ answers to the 
target question “Did you peek?” (0 = Truth, 1 = Lie) was entered as the dependent 
variable. Children’s age in years was entered on the first step, followed by Backward 
Digit Span scores on the second step. Step 1 of the model was significant, χ2 (1, N = 42) 
= 3.31, p =.069 (p = .035 one-tailed) indicating that as age increased, children were 
significantly more likely to lie about their transgression, ß = 0.55, Wald = 2.96, p = .085 
(p = .043 one-tailed). Step 2 of the model was also significant, χ2 (1, N = 42) = 3.11, p 
=.078 (p = .039 one-tailed). After controlling for age, as Backward Digit Span scores 
increased, children trended in the direction of being more likely to lie about their 
transgression, ß = 0.44, Wald = 2.60, p = .107 (p = .054 one-tailed).  
Inhibitory control tasks’ reliance on working memory.  
To examine the dependence of working memory on each inhibitory control 
measure (Day/Night Stroop, Bear/Dragon, and Delay of Gratification), correlations 
among working memory and inhibitory control measures were examined (see Table 3).
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Table 2     
Overall Range, Mean Scores, (and Standard Deviations) for Theory of Mind and Each Executive Functioning Skills and by Age    
 Sample Size (N)  Range  3 Years 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years Total 
Theory of Mind        
     First-Order False-Belief  49 0-4 0.84 (0.96) 2.15 (1.07) 2.60 (1.14) 3.00 (1.28) 1.90 (1.34) 
Inhibitory Control         
     Day/Night Stroop 48 0-16 9.55 (4.37) 8.84 (5.98) 7.60 (7.30) 11.25 (5.34) 9.58 (5.34) 
     Bear/Dragon 50 0-5 2.42 (2.32) 4.43 (1.50) 5.00 (0.00) 5.00 (0.00) 3.86 (1.98) 
     Delay of Gratification (in seconds)   50 0-300 98.81 (119.71) 216.86 (136.51) 240.60 (132.82) 300.00 (0.00) 194.33 (135.22) 
Working Memory         
     Backward Digit Span  42 0-8 0.25 (0.62) 2.08 (2.25) 5.00 (1.87) 4.75 (1.14) 2.67 (2.45) 
     Six Box Scramble  49 0-9 7.11 (2.37) 7.57 (1.70) 6.00 (3.74) 7.92 (2.23) 7.33 (2.32) 
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Table 3  
Correlations Among Children’s Age (in Years), Theory of Mind and Executive Function Scores  
Measure Age in Years First-Order False-Belief Day/Night Stroop Bear/Dragon Delay of Gratification Six Box Scramble 
Age in Years       
First-Order False-Belief .622***      
Day/Night Stroop .101____ .320*__     
Bear/Dragon .521***_ .475*** .085___    
Delay of Gratification .579***_ .419**_ .013___ .436**_   
Six Box Scramble .086____ -.167___ -.025___ .034___ .250___  
Backward Digit Span .756***__ .566*** .046___ .437**_ .587*** .195___ 
Note. *Correlation is significant at p = .05 level, **Correlation is significant at p =.01 level, ***Correlation is significant at p =.001 
level 
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Day/Night Stroop was not significantly related to Backward Digit Span task, r(41) = .05, 
p = .77. Thus, the Day/Night Stroop does not appear to be dependent on working 
memory. Both the Bear/Dragon task and Delay of Gratification task were significantly 
positively related to the Backward Digit Span task: r(42) = .437, p = .004; r(42) = .587, p 
<.001, respectively. Thus, these seem to be inhibitory control tasks that are working 
memory dependent. Therefore, the Day/Night Stroop appears to be an inhibitory control 
task that is less reliant on working memory whereas Bear/Dragon and Delay of 
Gratification seem to be working memory dependent tasks.  
Inhibitory control tasks.   
Day/Night Stroop. An independent samples t-test was conducted to assess 
whether Day/Night Stroop Scores (IV) related to children’s lie-telling behaviours (DV), 
which revealed that truth (M = 9.18, SD = 5.45) and lie-tellers (M = 9.81, SD = 5.36) did 
not significantly differ on Day/Night Stroop scores: t(46) = -0.39, p = .70 (see Table 4). 
Thus, scores on the Day/Night Stroop task, a task that does not require working memory, 
did not significantly relate to children’s decision to lie. 
Bear/Dragon. An independent samples t-test was conducted to assess whether 
children’s Bear/Dragon scores (IV) related to their lie-telling behaviours (DV), which 
revealed truth tellers (M = 2.67, SD = 2.47) had significantly lower scores than lie-tellers 
(M = 4.53, SD = 1.24): t(48) = -3.56, p =.001, d = - 0.95 (refer to Table 4). Thus, children 
who lied had higher inhibitory control and working memory skills together as measured 
by Bear/Dragon.  
Given that Bear/Dragon scores correlated with age (see Table 3), a hierarchical 
logistic regression was conducted to control for age. Peekers’ answers to the target 
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question “Did you peek?” (0 = Truth, 1 = Lie) was used as the dependent variable. 
Children’s age in years was entered on the first step, followed by Bear/Dragon scores on 
the second step. Step 1 of the model was significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 6.18, p =.013, 
indicating that as age increased, children were significantly more likely to lie about their 
transgression, ß = 0.69, Wald = 5.14, p = .023. Step 2 of the model was also significant, 
χ2 (1, N = 50) = 5.03, p =.025. After controlling for age, with increased Bear/Dragon 
scores, children were significantly more likely to lie about their transgression, ß = 0.411, 
Wald = 4.41, p = .036.  
Delay of gratification. An independent samples t-test was conducted to assess 
whether the length of time waited in the Delay of Gratification task (IV) related to 
children’s lie-telling behaviours (DV), which revealed truth tellers (M = 132.52, SD = 
139.42) had significantly lower scores than lie-tellers (M = 229.09, SD = 121.56): t(48) = 
-2.56, p =.014, d = -0.74 (see Table 4). Thus, children who lied had significantly higher 
inhibitory control and working memory skills together, as measured by Delay of 
Gratification wait time.   
Given that this Delay of Gratification wait times correlated with age (see Table 3), 
a hierarchical logistic regression was conducted to control for age. Peekers’ answers to 
the target question “Did you peek?” (0 = Truth, 1 = Lie) was entered as the dependent 
variable. Children’s age in years was entered on the first step, followed by Delay of 
Gratification scores on the second step. Step 1 of the model was significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) 
= 6.18, p =.013. As age increased, children were significantly more likely to lie about 
their transgression, ß = 0.69, Wald = 5.14, p = .023. However, the second step of the 
model was not significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 1.58, p = .209. Thus, children’s performance  
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Table 4 
Mean Scores (and Standard Deviations) of Theory of Mind and Each Executive Functioning Skill for Truth- and Lie-Tellers    
 Truth-Tellers Lie-Tellers p-value 
Theory of Mind      
     First-Order False-Belief  n=17 1.23 (1.30) n=32 2.25 (1.32) .013 
Inhibitory Control       
     Day/Night Stroop n=17 9.18 (5.45) n=31 9.81 (5.36) .700 
     Bear/Dragon n=18 2.67 (2.47) n=32 4.53 (1.24) .001 
     Delay of Gratification (in seconds)   n=18 132.52 (139.41) n=32 229.09 (121.56)  .014 
Working Memory       
     Backward Digit Span  n=13 1.31 (2.06) n=29 3.28 (2.40) .014 
     Six Box Scramble  n=18 6.88 (1.99) n=31 7.58 (2.23) .320 
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on the Delay of Gratification task did not significantly relate to their lie-telling 
behaviours above and beyond the contribution of age.  
Thus, two inhibitory control that were working memory dependent 
(Bear/Dragon and Delay of Gratification) significantly related to children's lie-telling; 
alternatively the inhibitory control task that was not working memory dependent 
(Day/Night Stroop) was not significantly related to children’s lie-telling. However, 
only the Bear/Dragon task related significantly to children’s lie-telling above and 
beyond the contribution of age.  
Self-Awareness and Lie-Telling 
 Honesty promotion. Next, to examine the effects self-awareness on 
children’s honesty a hierarchical logistic regression was conducted with peekers’ 
answers to the target question “Did you peek?” (0 = Truth, 1 = Lie) as the dependent 
variable. Children’s age in years was entered on the first step, followed by condition 
on the second step and age by condition interaction on the final step. Step 1 of the 
model was significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 6.18, p =.013. As age increased, children were 
significantly more likely to lie about their transgression, ß = 0.69, Wald = 5.14, p = 
.023 (see Table 1). Step 2 of the model was also significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 5.52, p 
=.009. Children in the self-awareness condition were significantly less likely to lie 
than children in the control condition (see Figure 2), ß = -1.82, Wald = 5.90, p = .015. 
The odds ratio revealed that children in the control condition were 6.21 times more 
likely to lie than children in the self-awareness condition. The final step of the model 
was not significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 0.01, p = .98, suggesting that the influence of 
condition did not vary with age.  
Theory of mind by condition interaction. To examine whether there was an 
interaction between theory of mind and condition (self-awareness vs. control), a 
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hierarchical logistic regression was conducted with peekers’ answers to the target 
question “Did you peek?” (0 = Truth, 1 = Lie) as the dependent variable. Children’s 
age in years was entered on the first step, followed by condition on the second step 
and theory of mind scores on the third. The theory of mind by condition interaction 
was entered on the final step. Step 1 of the model was significant, χ2 (1, N = 49) = 
6.15, p =.013. As age increased, children were significantly more likely to lie about 
their transgression, ß = 0.70, Wald = 5.06, p = .024. Step 2 of the model was also 
significant, χ2 (1, N = 49) = 5.98, p =.014. Children in the self-awareness condition 
were significantly less likely to lie than children in the control condition, ß = -1.72, 
Wald = 5.21, p = .022. The third step of the model was not significant, χ2 (1, N = 49) 
= 1.75, p = .185, indicating that children's lie-telling did not differ by theory of mind 
score. The final step of the model was not significant, χ2 (1, N = 49) = 2.43, p = .119, 
indicating that with increased theory-of-mind scores children’s frequency of lying did 
not vary by condition. 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of children who lied by condition.   
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Discussion 
 The current study investigated the development of lie-telling in 3- to 6-year-
old children, how social-cognitive and cognitive development relates to children's lie-
telling, as well as the effectiveness of a novel honesty promoting technique. First, I 
predicted that, consistent with previous literature, children's lie-telling would increase 
with age (e.g., Lee, 2013). This prediction was supported. In fact, while children told 
lies across all ages, children were approximately 2 times more likely to lie with each 
year increase in age according to the odds ratio.  
 Additionally, this investigation showed that only specific executive 
functioning skills such as complex working memory and inhibitory control and 
working memory together significantly related to children's lie-telling; in contrast, 
first-order false-belief, visuospatial working memory and a task solely measuring 
inhibitory control did not significantly relate to children's lie-telling. As well, it 
showed that self-awareness is an effective honesty promoting technique.  
Social-Cognitive and Cognitive Factors 
 I examined the validity of two theoretical models: ToM1 Hypothesis (e.g., 
Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002) and ADCM (Walczyk, et al., 2009), to 
examine how social-cognitive and cognitive factors relate to the development of lie-
telling in children. 
Theory of mind. It was predicted that the ToM1 hypothesis would be 
supported: children with better first-order false-belief scores will be more likely to lie 
(e.g., Polak & Harris, 1999; Talwar & Lee, 2002). However, this prediction was not 
supported as performance on the first-order false-belief tasks did not significantly 
relate to children’s lie-telling behaviours above and beyond the contribution of age. 
This suggests that first-order false-belief may be sufficient, but not necessary, for lie-
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telling to occur. Children have not been found to readily pass first-order false-belief 
tasks until about 4-to 5-years-of-age (e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983). However, 
observational and experimental studies have found that lie-telling emerges in children 
as young as 2 years (e.g., Evans & Lee, 2013; Newton et al., 2000; Wilson, Smith & 
Ross, 2003). For example, even 2-year-old children have told lies in a temptation 
resistance paradigm (Evans & Lee, 2013). Additionally, Newton et al. (2000) showed 
that 2.5-year-olds lied in an observational study. Furthermore, the prevalence and 
variety of lies told by these children did not differ depending on whether they passed 
or failed first-order false-belief tasks. Thus, other factors may also influence the 
emergence of lie-telling.  
The lack of a relationship between first-order false-belief and lie-telling is not 
surprising. Both non-typical children and children who have grown up in non-typical 
environments lack theory-of-mind skills, nonetheless these children lie earlier and 
better than typical children. Talwar and Lee (2011) examined how corporal 
punishment affected the development of preschoolers’ lie-telling and found that 
although children were matched on cognitive abilities, the preschoolers exposed to 
corporal punishment were about 12 times more likely to lie in a temptation resistance 
paradigm vs. those not exposed to corporal punishment. Thus, the punitive 
environment contributed to these preschoolers developing lie-telling abilities earlier, 
even though they lacked first-order false-belief. Moreover, Rasmussen, Talwar, 
Loomes, and Andrew (2008) examined how typically developing children and 
children with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorders (FASD) developed lie-telling 
behaviours and found that children with FASD lied more often and earlier than their 
typically developing matched counterparts, despite the fact that they should have 
poorer social-cognitive abilities (i.e., Theory of Mind). Children with FASD tend to 
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engage in more transgressions and delinquent behaviour that might require them to 
learn to lie earlier and more often as a means to conceal these actions.  Thus, despite 
lacking theory-of-mind skills children who grew up in a punitive environment and 
children with  FASD both lied more often and earlier than typically developing 
children, so theory-of-mind may be sufficient but not necessary for lie-telling.  
Working memory. Next, I also tested the effectiveness of the ADCM 
(Walczyk et al., 2009) by examining how executive functions related to lie-telling by 
looking at the contributions of working memory, inhibitory control, and how a 
combination of these two skills would relate to lie-telling. Specifically, I examined 
how different components of working memory related to children's lie-telling. 
Consistent with the ADCM I expected complex working memory, which is comprised 
of the phonological loop and central executive, but not visuospatial working memory, 
to relate to children's lie-telling. In support of this hypothesis, the complex working 
memory measure, Backward Digit Span, trended in the direction of being 
significantly and positively related to lie-telling while the visuospatial measure (Six 
Box Scramble) was not significantly related. According to the ADCM, complex 
working memory should relate to children's lie-telling because to lie you must hold 
the truth in the working memory store, which should involve rehearsal (i.e., 
phonological loop) while simultaneously constructing a lie, which should involve 
processing the truth to make up a lie (i.e., central executive). However, the reason 
there is only a trend instead of this being a statistically significant result might be due 
to the limited sample size of the present study. With increased sample size I expect 
this trend to become significant. Future studies should examine this with larger 
sample sizes to assess if this trend does become significant. One other study examined 
3- to 8- year-old children’s working memory and lie-telling and did not find a 
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significant relationship between the two factors, using a visuospatial working memory 
task (Talwar & Lee, 2008); thus, the current study’s findings, along with previous 
studies, suggests that lie-telling in the temptation resistance paradigm does not rely on 
visuospatial processing but rather requires complex working memory. Additionally, in 
the present investigation children's scores on the Six Box Scramble task scores did not 
vary with age, so in general this task may not be a good measure of children's working 
memory.  
Working memory and inhibitory control. Finally, it was predicted that 
inhibitory control in combination with working memory would relate to children's lie-
telling, but that inhibitory control on its own would not (e.g., Talwar & Lee, 2008). 
To examine this, I looked at the measures of inhibitory control and how they related 
to working memory. Since the Day/Night Stroop task was not significantly related to 
working memory it is a more pure inhibitory control measure. This more pure 
measure of inhibitory control did not significantly relate to children's lie-telling in the 
present study, providing support for the idea that inhibitory control alone is not 
sufficient for children’s lie-telling. Additionally, the prediction that the combination 
of inhibitory control and working memory would relate to lie-telling was partially 
supported.  The Bear/Dragon task predicted children’s lie-telling above and beyond 
age (ß = 0.411, Wald = 4.41, p = .036), but the Delay of Gratification task did not. It 
has been suggested that executive functioning tasks can differ in terms of “hot” vs. 
“cool” elements. For example, cool tasks are said to be more abstract, requiring less 
of a motivational or affective component compared to hot tasks, which involve 
emotionally significant consequences or motivation through gains/losses (e.g., Zelazo 
& Carlson, 2012). Since the Delay of Gratification task involves an external motivator 
(i.e., snack treats) it might be more of a “hot” executive functioning task compared to 
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the Bear/Dragon which has no external motivator. Future research should examine 
how this “hot” vs. “cool” distinction for executive functions relates to children’s lie-
telling. According to the ADCM, inhibitory control in combination with working 
memory should relate to children's lie-telling because to lie you must hold the truth in 
working memory and manipulate this truth into a lie, while simultaneously 
suppressing the truth to state the lie. In support of this, the present findings suggest 
that inhibitory control only relates to lie-telling when in combination with working 
memory. 
Self-Awareness as an Honesty Promoting Technique  
 I also aimed to examine the effectiveness of a novel honesty promoting 
technique: self-awareness. Given that children's moral transgressions are reduced by 
becoming self-aware (Beaman et al., 1979) and self-awareness seems to relate to 
adherence to social norms (Rochat et al., 2012), I predicted that inducing self-
awareness would increase honesty due to increasing adherence to the social norms of 
honesty. This prediction was supported: significantly fewer children in the self-
awareness condition (50%) lied than in the control condition (77%). Thus, self-
awareness is an effective honesty promoting technique.  
Further, I predicted that theory-of-mind understanding would interact with 
condition (i.e., control vs. self-awareness). It was expected that children in the self-
awareness condition who had higher first-order false belief scores would be less likely 
to lie than children in the control condition with higher first-order false belief scores. 
This prediction was not supported (χ2 (1, N = 49) = 0.98, p = .323). However, the 
non-significant finding here could be due to the age range used in the present study. It 
is not until about age 6 that children begin advancing in theory-of-mind understanding 
and gain second-order false-belief understanding (e.g., Perner & Wimmer, 1985). 
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Older children, with second-order false-belief, may be more impacted by the social 
awareness and adherence to social norms induced by the mirror than children with 
only first-order false-belief understanding because they have a more advanced social 
understanding. This is because with second-order false-belief understanding children 
are capable of dealing with multiple iterations in thought between themselves and 
another person; thus, children with second-order false-belief can think about how the 
experimenter would feel, as well as what the experimenter would think about 
themselves, if they had lied; conversely, younger children cannot make this 
connection, they can only understand that others can have different beliefs than 
themselves.  
Implications, Limitations, and Future Directions   
The present study has some theoretical implications for understanding the 
mechanisms behind children’s moral development. First, self-awareness reduced 
transgression rates in previous studies with children (e.g., Beaman et al., 1979) and 
increased honesty in the present study. Thus, self-awareness is a potential underlying 
mechanism in children’s moral development. In addition, no study to date has 
attempted to parse apart different executive functioning skills to look at potential 
individual contributors to the development of lie-telling. The present study suggests 
that visuospatial working memory and inhibitory control alone do not seem to be 
significantly related to lie-telling. On the other hand, complex working memory as 
well as inhibitory control and working memory collectively relate to children’s lie-
telling. However, to further examine the contributions of the inhibitory control 
measures, a larger sample size is needed to get enough power to assess the 
contribution of each individual executive functioning factor in a regression analysis.  
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 Practically, this study also has implications for improving children’s honesty. 
For example, very few studies have actually examined honesty promoting techniques 
and been found to be effective in improving honesty rates (e.g. Lyon & Dorado, 2008; 
Lyon et al., 2014; Talwar, et al., 2002). This study has discovered a novel technique 
than can be used to effectively increase children’s honesty. The use of a mirror to 
induce self-awareness could be used as a tool by parents and teachers for moral 
education programs. Additionally, children often testify in court (Bruck, et al., 1998) 
or provide evidence in forensic interviews.  Thus, children’s honesty is vital to the 
success of the legal system: protecting both children and the accused from dishonest 
accounts. This technique has the ability to be easily implemented into forensic 
interviews. For example, there are often one way mirrors in interview rooms. 
Interviewers would simply have to adjust their setup to have children face the mirror 
in the room during questioning. Further, the mirror technique would be inexpensive to 
implement, even if the room is not yet equipped with a mirror. This technique could 
also potentially be used when children, and possibly even adults, testify in court by 
placing a mirror in the courtroom for the witness to see their own reflection while 
testifying. Future studies need to examine the impact of the presence of a mirror on 
jurors perceptions honesty and the possible effectiveness of honesty promotion with 
adult witnesses.  
There are also several limitations to the present investigation. First, it had a 
limited sample size. Due to the nature of the temptation resistance paradigm, only 
children who turned around and peeked at the toy (N=50) could be examined in terms 
of being either truth- or lie-tellers. Further, the sample size was limited in a few ways. 
First, it was limited in terms of testing only children from ages 3 to 6 years. After this 
age children continue developing theory-of-mind (i.e., second-order false-belief), and 
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executive functioning skills, both of which are shown to be related to older children's 
lie-telling behaviours (e.g., Evans & Lee, 2011; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Secondly, the 
5-year-old peeker group consisted of very few children (N=5). In the future, it is 
planned to include a larger sample size in terms of age span as well as within each age 
group.  
 Another limitation is that the social-cognitive and cognitive factors (theory of 
mind and executive functioning) were all correlational. Thus, I can only conclude that 
inhibitory control in conjunction with working memory, and complex working 
memory, related to children's lie-telling development; causal conclusions cannot be 
made about these factors. Future studies should experimentally manipulate executive 
functioning demands during lie-telling to assess if taxing specific executive 
functioning skills hinder children's lie-telling ability.  Similarly, the present 
investigation was cross-sectional. Future studies should longitudinally assess the 
development of lie-telling in children across childhood to allow for an examination of 
whether there are individual differences in children’s lie-telling behaviour. For 
example, longitudinal studies starting prior to the development of some social-
cognitive and cognitive skills can show the progression of the development of these 
skills within a child along with their progression of lie-telling behaviours.   
Furthermore, other possible factors, both social and cognitive, that influence 
children’s honesty need to be assessed. Currently only one study has examined how 
parenting styles relate to children's lie-telling. Poplinger, Talwar and Crossman 
(2011) examined how parenting styles affect prosocial lie-telling; however no study to 
date has examined how parenting styles relate to children's antisocial lie-telling. It is 
possible that parenting style influences both the frequency and quality of children’s 
lies. For example, permissive parenting is associated with children having poorer 
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theory-of-mind (Guajardo, Snyder & Petersen, 2009) and reduced self-control 
(Bornstein, 2002). Authoritarian parenting is associated with children having hindered 
theory-of mind development, whereas authoritative parenting is associated with 
children having better false-belief understanding (Ruffman, Perner & Parkin, 1999). 
Taken together, these findings would suggest that children of authoritative parenting 
might have an advantage when it comes to lie-telling, whereas children with either 
permissive or authoritarian styles would potentially have difficulty.  Future studies 
should examine how parenting styles relate to children's antisocial lie-telling.  
 In terms of unexamined cognitive skills, one study has examined how 
planning ability relates to lie-telling, but examined 8- to 16-year-olds (Evans & Lee, 
2011). No study has examined planning ability in terms of lie-telling in children under 
the age of 8. Theoretically lie-telling should require planning. For example, to lie, one 
should have to plan to decide whether lying is appropriate in a given situation. 
Additionally, planning should be necessary to ensure there is consistency between 
deceptive statements. Thus, planning could be another executive functioning skill that 
is related to younger children's lie-telling. Evans and Lee (2011) found that children’s 
planning ability was not related to their decision to lie, but children with better 
planning abilities were better able at concealing incriminating evidence they ought to 
not know after denying a transgression they completed. Nonetheless, by the age of 8, 
children already have established lie-telling abilities (e.g., Evans & Lee, 2011; 
Talwar, et al., 2007; Talwar & Lee, 2008), so deciding to lie may no longer tax their 
planning skills; whereas, younger children may have to rely more heavily on their 
ability to plan whether lying in particular situation is appropriate. Thus, future studies 
should examine other executive functioning skills, such as planning ability, and how 
they relate to young children's lie-telling.  
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 Given that previous studies have found social-cognitive skills, cognitive skills 
(e.g., Evans & Lee, 2011; Evans & Lee, 2013; Talwar, et al., 2007; Talwar & Lee, 
2002; Talwar & Lee, 2008)  and parenting styles (Poplinger et al., 2011) relate to 
children's lie-telling behaviours, future studies should examine if these factors also 
relate to the effectiveness of honesty promoting techniques. For example, 
authoritative parenting seems to foster the development of conscience in children 
whereas authoritarian parenting tends to undermine the development of guilt 
(Kochanska & Aksan, 2006). Due to this, certain honesty promoting techniques may 
work better with children of parents with authoritative vs. authoritarian parenting 
styles.  
 Finally, since no honesty promoting technique to date has eliminated 
children's lie-telling, future studies should combine effective honesty promoting 
techniques (e.g., asking children to promise to tell the truth while inducing self-
awareness) to see if they are more effective in combination than on their own.  
 Overall, the present investigation provides insight into the development of 
children’s lie-telling behaviours in terms of social-cognitive and cognitive 
development as well as an honesty promoting technique. The results demonstrate that 
the frequency with which children tell lies increases with age. Additionally, the 
present investigation showed that although first-order false-belief understanding, 
inhibitory control, and visuospatial working memory did not significantly relate to 
children’s lie-telling, measures of inhibitory control and working memory together as 
well as complex working memory were significantly related to children’s lie-telling. 
In addition, it provides a novel honesty promoting technique, self-awareness, that can 
be easily used by parents, teachers, and the legal system.  
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